Immigration in the United States is often portrayed as a pathway to safety and opportunity, but recent events highlight how fragile that path can be. The case of Ayman Soliman, an Egyptian imam and former chaplain at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital in Ohio, serves as a stark reminder that even long-granted protections can be abruptly stripped away. Soliman’s story isn’t just about one individual. It is a cautionary tale for every immigrant navigating the U.S. system, where on single bureaucratic decision can upend lives without new evidence or court oversight.
A Brief Procedural Outline of the Soliman Case
Ayman Soliman fled Egypt in 2014, escaping persecution for his work in Egypt. He applied for asylum in 2015 and asylum was granted on June 7, 2018, by U.S. immigration authorities. For seven years, Mr. Soliman built a life in Ohio, serving his community as a spiritual leader and hospital chaplain, with no criminal record or indications of wrongdoing. He pursued his green card after one year in asylee status, as required by law. His application was delayed and never resolved by immigration authorities.
In December 2024, with no explanation as to what triggered this review, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) notified him that they intended to terminate his asylum status. Without any new evidence presented, a single asylum officer in Chicago terminated his asylum on June 3, 2025. This decision was made administratively by that one officer. That decision led to his case being referred to the Immigration Court and detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on July 9, 2025. Mr. Soliman now faces deportation back to Egypt, where he fears torture or death. At present, he must now defend his application for asylum from behind prison walls.
This procedural timeline underscores a key vulnerability: asylum grants are not ironclad. They can be reopened and revoked based on shifting interpretations of historical events, often by a lone government employee, leaving immigrants in limbo after years of stability.
Summary of Case Law on the Material Support Bar in Immigration Proceedings
The material support of terrorism bar, codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) at Section 212(a)(3)(B), renders individuals inadmissible or ineligible for asylum if they have provided “material support” to a terrorist organization, even if it was coerced, unintentional or minimal. This bar has been broadly interpreted by courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), often denying relief to those who provided support under duress or in negligible amounts.
Key decisions highlight the bar’s rigidity, particularly in cases of forced or minimal support. In Matter of A-C-M- (2018), the BIA ruled that an El Salvadoran woman who was kidnapped and forced to cook, clean, and carry supplies for the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a designated by the U.S. government terrorist group, provided “material support” because her actions had a “logical and reasonably foreseeable tendency to promote” the group’s activities. The board explicitly rejected duress as a defense, stating that the statute contains no implicit exception for coercion.
Similarly, in Annachamy v. Holder (9th Cir. 2012), the court upheld the denial of asylum to a Sri Lankan man who donated the equivalent of about $60 to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) under implied threats. The support was deemed “material” despite its small amount and coercive context, as the courts speculated that it could aid the group’s operations. Courts have applied this to gang and oppressor cases as well. For instance, in Barahona v. Holder (9th Cir. 2014), paying a “war tax” or extortion fee to Salvadoran guerrillas was considered material support, even if paid under threat of violence. This decision ultimately led to that refugee’s asylum denial. In Sesay v. Attorney General(3d Cir. 2011), forced labor for the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone where the refugee was forced to carry arms and ammunition under duress, was ruled material support, barring the refugee from receiving asylum from relief.
These cases illustrate how the bar captures victims of terrorism alongside perpetrators and allows for not distinguishment between the two. While USCIS has discretion to grant exemptions for duress in certain situations, such as situational exemptions under Terrorism Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG) policies, these are not automatic and require case-by-case approval, often leaving coerced individuals without protection and no clear guidance as to what is required to demonstrate that they have been a victim of terrorism.
Analyzing the Law on Tier III Terrorist Organization Determinations
Under the INA, terrorist organizations are divided into three tiers. Tier I and II are formally designated by the State Department or executive order, but Tier III is for undesignated terrorist organizations and offers broad discretion to government employees, often without any oversight, or without concern for national security interests or foreign policy. A Tier III group is defined as any group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, that engages in “terrorist activity” as outlined in INA Section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), such as committing acts of violence, sabotage, or threats to civilians.
The asylum officer must make specific findings: (1) the group exists and consists of at least two people; (2) it has engaged, or is engaging, in terrorist activity as defined by the act; and (3) the activity is unlawful under the laws of the place where it occurred or would be if committed in the U.S. No formal designation process is required so an officer can determine Tier III status ad hoc during an individual case review, based on available evidence like reports, testimony, intelligence, or just their own interpretation of current events.
This power is extraordinarily broad. USCIS guidance emphasizes that officers evaluate the totality of circumstances, but without public scrutiny or a centralized list, determinations can vary by case or shift over time, or reflect the benefit of hindsight, or even the bias of the asylum officer. For example, opposition groups in authoritarian regimes might be retroactively viewed as Tier III if their actions are reinterpreted as “terrorist” years later. This flexibility allows a single officer to label a group based on evolving geopolitical views, potentially creating bars for thousands of asylees and permanent residents, or even naturalized citizens without any oversight.
Analyzing President Trump’s Executive Order Designating Cartels as Terrorist Groups
On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14157, titled “Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” declaring a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to address threats posed by international cartels and transnational organizations. The order highlights how these groups, through violence, terror, and infiltration, destabilize the Western Hemisphere, control illegal border traffic, and flood the U.S. with drugs and criminals, posing an unacceptable national security risk. It directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with other officials, to recommend designations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) under INA Section 219 or Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under IEEPA and Executive Order 13224. Additionally, it prepares for the potential invocation of the Alien Enemies Act to expedite removals and operational preparations for invasions or incursions.
Following the executive order, on the same day, the State Department designated eight organizations as both FTOs and SDGTs: Tren de Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Cártel de Sinaloa, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, Cártel del Noreste (formerly Los Zetas), La Nueva Familia Michoacana, Cártel de Golfo (Gulf Cartel), and Cárteles Unidos.
Subsequent actions include a February 5, 2025, memorandum from the Attorney General directing the Department of Justice to pursue the “total elimination” of these cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), referencing the executive order and emphasizing charging priorities like terrorism and IEEPA violations, suspension of certain approval requirements for prosecutions, and expansion of task forces to combat the groups. This rapid designation process exemplifies how executive actions can swiftly elevate criminal groups to terrorist status, impacting immigration by triggering the material support bar for anyone with past associations, even minimal or coerced, such as in Barahona, where the payment of extortion in an effort to prevent being murdered was deemed material support.
How the Government Can Retroactively Revoke Protections—and Why It Threatens Every Immigrant
The issues above converge to reveal a troubling reality: the U.S. government can retroactively designate a group as terrorist, even through a single asylum officer’s determination, and use that to revoke asylum, block adjustment of status, or deny naturalization. Under TRIG, if a group is newly interpreted as Tier III, or if material support is reassessed based on the facts previously reviewed, prior grants can be terminated without new evidence. Exemptions exist but are discretionary and limited, often excluding coercion or instances of minimal support.
In Soliman’s case, seven years after his asylum grant, an officer reexamined his background and terminated asylum by reclassifying Egyptian groups as Tier III terrorist groups, despite the U.S. government’s official position to the contrary and despite the Egyptian government official position, also contrary to the opinion of the asylum officer. This mirrors broader patterns where victims of extortion by gangs or forced contributions to oppressors lose protections, as seen in Matter of A-C-M- and similar rulings. President Trump’s Executive Order cartel designations hints at how quickly labels can change, potentially affecting millions from cartel-influenced areas.
The implication is clear: any immigrant granted asylum or seeking new or other immigration benefits could face the same fate. A single USCIS employee may determine that based on the facts in their case, even from years ago, now should be reopened under reinterpretations of what is a designated terrorist organization for Tier I and II, or just the officers own interpretation of what should be considered a terrorist organization, under Tier III.
A change in administration, a new intelligence report, a news article, all give an asylum officer broad discretion to reopen cases from decades ago. For refugees from conflict zones, where minimal interactions with armed groups and forced payment of extortion under threat of murder are common, this creates perpetual uncertainty. Mr. Soliman’s ordeal shows that no grant is truly final and will always subject to the decision-making whims of a single USCIS employee. Forever.
