New EOIR Policy Memo Highlights Uncertainty in BIA Precedents

In a quietly released policy memorandum dated July 3, 2025, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has drawn attention to longstanding conflicts in precedents set by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Titled “Conflicting Precedents of the Board of Immigration Appeals” and designated as PM 25-34, the memo from Acting Director Sirce E. Owen provides guidance to EOIR personnel on handling situations where BIA decisions point in opposing directions. While the memo does not resolve these conflicts or mandate specific outcomes, it spotlights two critical areas: administrative closure of cases and protection claims based on allegations of domestic violence. This analysis examines these sections, drawing directly from the memo’s content, and explores their implications for immigration proceedings.

Analysis of Section II: Administrative Closure

Section II of PM 25-34 addresses administrative closure, a procedural mechanism that allows immigration judges to temporarily remove a case from the active docket. The memo references PM 25-29, “Cancellation of Director’s Memorandum 22-03,” which previously identified a conflict in BIA precedent on this topic. Specifically, it states that the BIA’s decision in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), “squarely conflicts with multiple, earlier Board precedents regarding whether an Immigration Judge may overrule the decision of the Department of Homeland Security to prosecute a case.”

According to the memo, Matter of Avetisyan neither acknowledged these prior conflicting precedents nor explicitly overruled them, which it describes as contrary to basic administrative law principles. The memo notes that Matter of Avetisyan was largely superseded by the 2024 rulemaking titled “Efficient Case and Docket Management in Immigration Proceedings,” 89 FR 46742 (May 29, 2024) (referred to as the ECDM Rule). However, Matter of Avetisyan “still remains a valid precedent, albeit one in direct conflict with prior precedents.”

The memo emphasizes that for issues of administrative closure not expressly covered by the ECDM Rule, immigration judges must decide whether to follow Matter of Avetisyan or the earlier line of cases.

Analysis of Section III: Protection Claims Based on Allegations of Domestic Violence

Section III focuses on protection claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) where the alleged harm stems from domestic violence. The memo cites Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461 (BIA 1975), where the BIA held that an alien claiming fear of harm from her husband, with allegations that Haitian authorities would not protect her due to his government position, did not establish a cognizable basis for protection under then-INA § 243(h). The memo quotes the decision: “The respondent does not allege that her husband seeks to persecute her on account of her race, religion, or political beliefs. The motivation behind his alleged actions appears to be strictly personal.” It adds that even if the government was unable or unwilling to restrain the husband, the claim would not qualify, as “not every unlawful act of individual harassment will amount to persecution.”

The memo states that Matter of Pierre has not been overruled and remains good law. It also references other BIA decisions, such as Matter of Y-G-, 20 I&N Dec. 794 (BIA 1994), which held that “aliens fearing retribution over purely personal matters will not be granted asylum on that basis,” as such harm is not on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

In contrast, the memo discusses Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), which held that aliens whose claims are rooted in personal matters such as domestic violence could establish a claim for protection under the INA. However, the memo points out that Matter of A-R-C-G- did not address or acknowledge its conflict with prior precedents like Matter of Pierre, effectively attempting to overrule them sub silentio, contrary to administrative law principles.

The memo notes that the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) (A-B- III) does not resolve this conflict, as it directs adjudicators to follow relevant precedents prior to 2018, and both lines of precedent predate that year.

Because these conflicting lines remain valid, the memo states that immigration judges must determine whether Matter of A-R-C-G- or the earlier cases govern in such claims.

Outline of What PM 25-34 Means for People in Immigration Court

PM 25-34 underscores uncertainty in BIA precedents, which can affect respondents (individuals facing removal) in immigration proceedings. The memo states that the BIA lacks a formal “prior-panel-precedent” rule but operates under a functional equivalent per 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3), requiring a majority vote of permanent Board members to publish a decision overruling prior precedent. It highlights that conflicting precedents create uncertainty for immigration judges on which decision to follow.

For respondents, this means:

• Outcomes may vary based on how judges interpret conflicts, using factors like factual distinctions, legal developments, circuit court approaches, or other relevant elements.
• Judges must articulate in decisions why one precedent was chosen over another to ensure fidelity to law and facilitate BIA review.
• The memo does not direct adjudicators to apply specific precedents but provides guidance until the BIA or Attorney General resolves conflicts.
• It cannot create enforceable rights or benefits and does not limit adjudicators’ independent judgment under applicable law.

Outline of Rules for Seeking Administrative Closure in Light of PM 25-34’s Reasoning

Based on PM 25-34, rules for administrative closure are outlined as follows:

• Administrative closure is governed primarily by the ECDM Rule, 89 FR 46742 (May 29, 2024), which largely superseded Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012).
• For issues not expressly covered by the ECDM Rule, judges must determine whether Matter of Avetisyan or earlier conflicting precedents control.
• Matter of Avetisyan conflicts with earlier precedents on whether judges can overrule DHS’s decision to prosecute.
• Per 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3), overruling prior precedent requires a majority vote  of permanent Board members.
• Judges should use traditional legal tools, considering factual distinctions,legal developments, circuit court treatments of conflicts, and other      factors.
• Decisions must clearly explain the choice of precedent.

Outline of Rules and Applicable Law for Establishing an Asylum Claim Based on Domestic Violence Based on PM 25-34

Based on PM 25-34, rules and law for asylum claims rooted in domestic violence are outlined as follows:

• Claims must show persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion under INA § 241(b)(3) (successor to former INA § 243(h)).
• Under Matter of Pierre, 15 I&N Dec. 461 (BIA 1975), claims based on strictly personal motivations, such as harm from a spouse where authorities are unable or unwilling to protect, do not qualify, as they are not on protected grounds.
• Matter of Y-G-, 20 I&N Dec. 794 (BIA 1994), reinforces that fears over purely personal matters are not bases for asylum.
• In contrast, Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), holds that claims rooted in personal matters like domestic violence can establish      protection.
• Judges must determine which line governs, as the conflicts remain unresolved.
• Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021), directs following pre-2018 precedents but does not resolve the conflict, as both lines predate 2018.
• Judges should consider factual distinctions, legal developments, circuit approaches, and other factors, articulating the choice in decisions.